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The political parties in Cyprus are extremely powerful. They play a 
dominant role in the public as well as the private sphere, resulting in a 
civil society that is extremely weak. The article will address two issues. 
First, it will map the evolution of civil society organisations (CSOs), 
especially the trade unions, and their relationship with political parties. 
Trade unions are probably the most important and influential of the 
CSOs in Cyprus. Second, it will examine the relationship between 
political parties and trade unions in contemporary Cyprus, focusing on 
the changing context within which their interaction takes place, the 
strategies adopted by the two actors and the direction of influence 
between them. Research and analysis are based on interviews, surveys, 
party documents and other secondary literature.  
Keywords: Cyprus, political parties, civil society, trade unions, AKEL, 
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Research shows that in politicised and polarised societies, most civil 
society organisations (CSOs) are little more than extensions of the major 
political parties; many trade unions (TUs) in particular would fit this 
description (Duverger, 1954, pp. 5-7). The relationships between parties 
and CSOs will vary according to a number of factors including: the nature 
of the polity, the legal provisions, the society’s conception of the two 
entities, the level of public confidence in the political institutions, the 
characteristics of civil society and party organisations, etc. A general 
observation is that a strong party system will act as an obstacle to the 
functionality and efficiency --as well as the very existence-- of CSOs 
(Bevis, 2003, p. 4). 
This article addresses two issues: first, the historical evolution of the 
relationship between political parties and CSOs in Cyprus focusing more 
explicitly on TUs; second, the relationships between political parties and 
TUs, especially the changing context of their interaction in recent years, 
the strategies employed by the two actors and the direction of influence 
between them. This paper will focus on the two major political parties of 
Cyprus (left-wing AKEL
1
 and right-wing DISY
2
) and the two largest trade 
                                                 
1
 AKEL: Progressive Party of the Working People (left-wing). Originally founded as the 
Communist Party of Cyprus in 1926; renamed AKEL in 1941. Historically, the party captures 
approximately one-third of the electorate. From the outset AKEL developed strong ties with 
the labour movement. 
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The links between political actors are usually formed in relation to 
historical processes—highlighting a dynamic element in their 
relationship. Coalitions and alignments will vary and shift as a result of 
societal changes and/or significant historical events. Therefore, history 
matters. To investigate the changing context of the interaction between 
the two entities, I draw on the works of Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick (2010) and Schmitter (2008).  These authors have identified 
several recent key developments that altered both the trade union 
context as well as party activity. The analysis of how the two parties 
interact with TUs in more modern times will also utilise the Bevis model 
(2003) (see below).  
The article comprises five sections. The first section looks at the 
literature focused on interest groups (and especially TUs) and their 
relationship with political parties. It also presents the analytical 
framework of this investigation. The second section offers a brief 
overview of the island’s political and party systems focusing on CSOs’ 
historical and current position vis-à-vis the parties and the state. The 
third section offers a historical perspective of the relationships between 
parties and TUs. The fourth section addresses the various social and 
political changes that have altered the context within which party and 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 DISY: Democratic Rally (right-wing) was founded in 1976 and constituted the vehicle for 
unifying the right-wing forces under the charismatic leadership of Glafkos Clerides, former 
President of the Republic (1993-2003). It is currently the biggest and the governing party in 
the country. 
3
 PEO: the Pancyprian Federation of Labour was founded in 1941 and has since established 
close ties with AKEL. 
4
 SEK: the Cyprus Workers Federation was established in 1944 as a means for right-wing 
forces and the Church to counterbalance AKEL’s rising influence among the working class.  
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trade union relations have developed in recent years. The fifth section 
explores the relationship between AKEL and DISY with certain TUs (PEO 
and SEK).  
Research tools include secondary literature, surveys and opinion polls, 
personal interviews with party and TU officials and party documents. 
Personal interviews are indicative and are based on a semi-structured 
questionnaire. Interviewees included party and trade union officials, 
which affords a complete picture of the history between the two actors 
as well as their evolving relationship in contemporary Cyprus. An 
interview was also conducted with a representative of the NGO Support 
Center, an organisation that facilitates the creation of NGOs in various 
areas of activities, in order to have a general view on the CSO sector in 
Cyprus and their relations with political parties. The NGO Support Center 
was also responsible for the first ever comprehensive study in CSOs in 
Cyprus in 2005. All interviewees were informed and gave oral consent to 
use quotes from their interviews in the article.  
2.  Political Parties and Interest Groups 
The relationship between political parties and interest groups is both 
crucial and controversial. While it is generally believed that the two 
actors are involved in a zero-sum game (e.g., Almond and Powell, 1966), 
this may not actually be the case. The two may share long-term policy 
goals, and to this end interest groups will provide parties with political 
and other expertise, financial resources and organisational support in 
order to influence public policy, etc., while the party sees its traditional 
functions like mobilisation and representation being increasingly 
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performed by CSOs (Allern and Bale, 2012, p. 8). Consequently, the 
boundaries between the two are not so crystal clear. In a similar vein, 
some scholars and NGO activists demonise political parties as the main 
enemy of civil society. However, despite their shortcomings, political 
parties play a unique role in democratic systems (Dippell, 2000; Bevis, 
2003, pp. 1-2), and so the solution does not lie in the abolition of 
political institutions. Active and strong political institutions are both 
necessary and desirable for democratic freedom and equality (Keane, 
1993, p. 59).  
Political parties and CSOs have forged various types of relationships. In 
the early phases of modern European politics, strong links were 
established between socialist parties and trade unions, between 
agrarian parties and farmers’ unions, and between religious parties and 
certain organisations (Duverger, 1954, pp. 5-7; Von Beyme, 1985, p. 
192). The conservative parties followed suit by establishing alliances 
with business associations and other organisations (Schmitter, 2001, p. 
82). However, in more recent times, scholars purport that the 
traditionally strong links between particular parties and interest groups 
have weakened along with social cleavages (Allern and Bale, 2012, pp. 8-
9). The common belief now is that parties are less reliant on support 
from members and affiliate organisations and more dependent on state 
resources (Katz and Mair, 1995). 
The notion of relationship in the present context usually refers to how 
parties and CSOs are linked as organisations, and how they interact 
(Allern and Bale, 2012, p. 10). The literature suggests several directions 
this relationship may take. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized that 
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some parties (socialists, religious) developed their own social networks, 
while other scholars consider that their linkage is more likely based on 
leadership, membership overlap or collective activities (Koelbe, 1987, p. 
256). Sometimes the relationship is rather abstract, pointing to 
ideological affinity (Poguntke, 2006), and sometimes it takes an 
economic perspective with the CSOs financially supporting the parties 
(Yishai, 2001). Thomas (2001, pp. 270-2) concluded that there is no 
single pattern of party-interest relationships within or across countries, 
even if the links between the two actors, in general, seem rather weak.  
Political parties and trade unions 
There is substantial research on relationship patterns between political 
parties and trade unions. For example, Hayward (1980, pp. 5-6) 
identified four distinct patterns: first, a ‘Leninist model’ in which the 
party seeks to control the policies and actions of its associated union; 
second, more exceptionally, the British case in which the unions 
themselves created the political party (Labour Party) and felt it was their 
right/duty to dictate policies; third, a more general social-democratic 
pattern involving ‘interdependence and symbiosis’; finally, a position in 
which unions, even if politically engaged, refuse any alliance with 
political parties.  
Ebbinghaus (1993) has drawn on the cleavage theory to explain 
distinctive national patterns and to argue that their evolution is path-
dependent. He identifies all four models described above as different 
outcomes of the fundamental cleavage between labour and capital, but 
stresses two other cleavages. In countries where there was historically a 
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sharp confrontation between church and state, divisions between 
secular (commonly socialist) and religious identities led to an ideological 
segmentation of unions and parties competing for working-class 
allegiance. These divisions often produced a third cleavage, between 
reformist and revolutionary unions and parties—this occurred most 
notably in southern Europe. 
Hyman and McCormick (2010, pp. 321-22) argue that, almost universally, 
highly dependent relationships between parties and unions – in either 
direction – have historically given way to looser attachments and a more 
flexible interdependence, and sometimes even a complete divorce. The 
authors identify three key developments in the past few decades that 
have affected these relationships. The first is cultural and ideological. 
Ideologies inherited from the formative period of trade unions have 
proved persistent, shaping identities and relations to political parties, 
which cannot easily be altered. However, all trade unions have been 
subject to “ideological blurring”. Secularisation has undermined the 
identities of formerly Christian-democratic unionism while in those 
countries with mass communist parties and satellite trade unions, an 
analogous process occurred in the post-1990 era.  
The second key development is structural. Traditionally, both trade 
unions and left-oriented parties have found their core support among 
manual workers in cohesive industrial communities. The decline in 
industrial work, the growth in white-collar and professional occupations 
and, more generally, rising educational levels have posed challenges for 
both unions and parties. Many union movements have found these 
newer working groups difficult to recruit (at least in the private sector); 
  7 
where they succeed, however, the homogeneity of interests and 
identities within the membership declines. The third key change is in the 
politico-economic environment. Economic hard times have resulted in 
largely neoliberal responses, especially in recent times. International 
competitiveness, efforts to contain public finances, loss of faith in 
Keynesianism and conversion to “lean government” have become as 
much the hallmarks of centre-left as of right-wing governments. 
In a similar vein, Schmitter (2008, pp. 201-8) identified several 
developments that have contributed to this changing environment, 
including: the impact of exogenous shocks, e.g., the collapse of the 
socialist rule; the process of globalisation / liberalisation, i.e., the process 
of removing all types of barriers to the flow of goods, services, money 
and --to a lesser extent—people, which  profoundly affect the relative 
power of classes; regional integration in Europe, i.e., the EU, which has 
significantly reduced the negotiating power of national actors; the 
massive increase in migration flows that led to an abundant low-cost 
foreign labour source that replaces the national labour force and, in 
turn, again affects the balance of class forces at the national level; 
individuation, which he believes that has the most profound impact on 
the politics of interest. 
As a result of these changes, the political parties and the TUs have both 
suffered a huge decline in power. Developments and changes in western 
Europe in the last few decades point to a demise of the party. The 
indicators include: public distrust of politics in general and political 
parties in particular; party competition that is increasingly characterised 
by ideological decline and increased political consensus; the reduced 
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importance of party identification; reduced membership, etc. (Mair, 
1984; Bartolini, 1983, p. 214; Lane and Ersson, 1997, p. 191; Daalder, 
1992, p. 269). Likewise, unions have also suffered deterioration in 
membership numbers, collective bargaining outcomes and political 
influence (Schmitter, 2008, pp. 199-200). Many European trade unions 
members criticise their organisations’ political attachments, and many 
cite this as a reason for non-membership (Hyman and McCormick, 2010, 
p. 316). Despite their loss of power, TUs still attempt to influence the 
ways in which the state shapes the rules of the game in the labour 
market; in fact, Korpi (1983) has argued that strong trade unions 
increasingly shift their focus from conflict in the industrial arena to 
pressure in the political arena, i.e., the parties. 
The current investigation will draw on the works of Hyman and 
McCormick (2010) and Schmitter (2008), as well as. Bevis’s (2003) model 
for the relationships between political parties and TUs. This model 
evaluates these relationships along three dimensions: (a) the type of 
activity linking a party and a group; (b) the strength of this link, i.e., the 
closeness and exclusiveness; and (c) the direction of the influence. 
Activities that connect the two actors include: lobbying and advocacy on 
specific issues, information and analysis, candidate forums, leadership 
overlap and voter mobilisation. On the other hand, trade unions may 
avoid contact with parties, distribute support across parties, ally with 
one party or seek to form a party, while the parties may have distant 
relations with TUs, or have more exclusive relations with specific TUs. A 
party may request support from a TU and in return support TU issues in 
decision-making arenas, pursue the union’s preferred policies by 
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providing money and other material support. Clearly, the direction of 
influence can go both ways.  
The way in which political actors behave is conditioned by their 
institutional, political and cultural settings, factors that structure both 
their relationships and their character. For example, a parliamentary 
system will shape how parties are likely to rely on interest groups very 
differently than a presidential system. Presidential systems are seen as 
supportive of these groups, whereas a political system built on 
nationalism and clientelistic relations is more likely to be unfriendly 
toward civil society groups (Mavratsas, 2003). The degree to which a 
party system is considered strong or weak influences the environment 
within which a civil society functions. Therefore, it is important to first 
examine the political and party system of Cyprus. 
3. The Cypriot Party System and the CSOs 
The political system of Cyprus changed fundamentally with the island’s 
independence in 1960. However, remnants of the old regime were still in 
place -namely, the tension between the two larger ethnic communities 
of the island (Greek and Turkish Cypriots) incited by British imperialism. 
Due to Cyprus’s late independence, the island was given little chance to 
develop a civic and democratic culture: it suffered sporadic inter-
communal violence and has been de facto divided since 1974. 
Nationalism has been the dominant ideology throughout the twentieth 
century. The constitution of the Republic provides for a clear separation 
of powers: the President holds executive power and is not accountable 
to the Parliament. The power vested in the president’s office (in Cyprus’s 
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rigorous presidential system of administration), places the elected 
president at the heart of the political system. However, the entire 
political structure is centred on the institution of political parties. The 
parties play a crucial role in every aspect of political life: they are the 
exclusive nominators of presidents and deputies and the principal 
nominator of mayors and municipal councillors (for a more detailed 
discussion on the role of parties in Cyprus, see Katsourides 2012). 
The development of political forces across the ideological Rubicon was 
totally divergent. The left side was united and dominated by AKEL early 
on. No type of social democratic party ever managed to become strong 
enough to threaten AKEL’s supremacy. On the right, the picture was 
completely different: division and fragmentation were the principal 
features until 1976; this scenario still applies today, but to a much lesser 
extent. Political parties did not really acquire the complexion of the 
parties we know today until after 1974, with the domination of four 
parties that take more than 90% of the votes: the left-wing AKEL, the 
social democratic EDEK, the centre-right Democratic Party (DIKO) and 
the right-wing DISY. Other smaller parties did not manage to break this 
pattern until the mid-1990s when, among other factors, proportional 
representation was introduced in June 1995, which lowered the 
entrance barrier to the minimum (1.79%) and the franchise was 
extended to all adults above the age of 18 in 1997. Voting is to this day 
compulsory; however, it was essentially made redundant after the 
country’s accession to the EU in 2004.  
The dominance of politics in Cyprus is a common feature in what 
Mouzelis (1994, p. 20) refers to as ‘societies of late development’. In 
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these societies, politics penetrate all aspects of social and institutional 
life. In Cyprus, it is evident that the political agenda plays a consistent 
and forceful role in any discussion of the society (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 28). 
The political agenda permeates all aspects of society, influencing the 
education system, media reporting, and the development of both the 
private sector and civil society. This situation is further intensified by the 
unresolved Cyprus problem, which has monopolised the entire political 
life of the island, and which heavily contributes to the politicisation of 
Cypriot society. Over-politicisation in a country with an unresolved 
ethnic problem is thought to lead to a relative atrophy of civil society 
and a prominence of political parties (Mavratsas, 2003, p. 121). In 
Cyprus this atrophy is manifest in terms of the mass media’s lack of 
autonomy, the commanding role of the Cyprus Orthodox Church, the 
lack of respect for individual rights and the social marginalisation of 
foreigners, the corporatist features in the society especially as portrayed 
by the powerful role of the state, political parties and trade unions and, 
finally, the impressive growth of the economy but also its small size. On 
the ideological level the key force that suppresses civil society is 
nationalism, which translates into a lack of tolerance and a reluctance to 
engage in social criticism. Civil society’s historically weak position and its 
dependence on the state and the political parties are well known (see 
CIVICUS, 2005; Kotelis and Cuhadar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Hadjipavlou and 
Kanol, 2008, p. 43). Historically, CSOs have wielded little influence unless 
they include members of the ruling political parties (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 
29). 
When studying the evolution of civil society in Cyprus, it is important to 
note two distinct periods (waves) that reflect different concerns and 
  12 
different degrees of affiliation to state institutions and political parties. 
The first wave of CSOs in Cyprus was to a large extent controlled by or 
affiliated with the central government or the political parties. The 
governing bodies of these CSOs were appointed by the state and their 
budget was (and still is) totally covered by the state. This first wave was 
based on the human rights of people affected by the Turkish invasion in 
1974.
5
 CSOs were comprised of citizens who belonged to particular 
groups (e.g., they were refugees themselves) and they actively 
campaigned for their cause either domestically or internationally 
(Demetriou and Gurel, 2008, p. 28).  
The organisations of this first wave also included sports and youth 
associations as well as many other social groups either naturally or 
ideologically tied to political parties (Kotelis and Cuhadar, 2008, p. 7). All 
amateur football clubs and cultural associations in Cypriot communities 
and villages, and also all trade unions, are either leftist or rightist. The 
Church of Cyprus has historically been linked with right-wing political 
forces (Katsiaounis, 2000; Christophorou, 2006). The impact of the left-
right axis and the pervasiveness of the Cyprus problem constituted the 
frame within which these first CSOs were established and consequently 
influenced the causes they pursued and the affiliations they developed.  
Beginning in the early 1990s and following and/or developing along the 
set of changes examined below, a second wave of CSOs appeared. The 
CSOs of the second wave are made up of members who are not affected 
directly by the purposes of the organisation, at least not in the short-
                                                 
5
 There are three major CSOs of this kind: the Pancyprian Union of Refugees, the Pancyprian 
Committee of Parents and Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons, and the 
Relief Fund for Affected Persons. 
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term. Examples include ecological groups, organisations for the political 
rights of immigrants and asylum seekers, organisations for the 
modernisation of society, cultural associations, etc. From the very 
outset, these organisations intended to operate freely, with no overlap 
with the political parties and the state (Karayianni interview). 
Consequently, they have no overt relationship with political parties, and 
some CSOs even forbid this practice through their statutes. 
Nevertheless, some have attachments and affiliations to parties either in 
terms of personal relations or on ideological and political terms, but 
none have any intrinsic attachments.  
4. The relationships between parties and trade unions in 
historical perspective 
The history of the Cyprus trade union movement can be separated into 
four periods (Sparsis, 1995, p. 5), with a fifth period following Cyprus’s 
official negotiations for EU accession in 1998, which signaled an era of 
harmonisation with EU directives. The first period covers the years 
between 1910 and 1931. During this period the trade union movement 
was essentially non-existent, although there were a few scattered 
unions mainly associated with the newborn Communist Party (CPC) and 
individual politicians. The second period began in 1931 with the British 
colonial authorities’ imposition of an autocratic regime in the aftermath 
of the Greek Cypriot-led October revolt and lasted until 1941. In January 
1932 the British government enacted the first ever legislation on trade 
unions, which in effect constituted the official recognition of the Cypriot 
trade union movement. By the end of this second period the trade union 
movement managed to increase its numbers, while in 1939 the illegal 
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CPC made an unsuccessful attempt to unite all trade unions under a 
common umbrella.  
The third stage began in 1941 with the establishment of the Pancyprian 
Trade Unions Committee (PSE) and represents the years until Cyprus’s 
independence (1960). This period is considered crucial in the process of 
the labour movement’s institutionalisation in Cyprus (Sparsis, 1995, p. 
9). The mass labour and anti-colonial struggles in the 1940s forced the 
British authorities to recognise the situation and integrate the trade 
unions into their colonial institutions. It was no accident that the Labour 
Advisory Body, which comprised colonial authorities, employers and 
workers, was founded in 1949. It represented a precursor to the 
tripartite cooperation of state, trade union and employer associations, 
which developed further in subsequent decades (Ioannou, 2011). It was 
also the time that the labour movement divided along ideological lines 
and a period when several trade unions in the government and semi-
government sector chose to form independent unions (later on, 
however, they became part of the right-wing trade union confederation 
SEK).  
The fourth period extends from 1960 to the country’s official beginning 
of negotiations for EU accession in 1998. It was during this period that 
many important institutions were set up to govern industrial relations in 
Cyprus. The year 1998 is considered landmark because it was then that 
the labour market in Cyprus underwent significant changes in order to 
harmonise with acquis communautaire. 
The most important feature of industrial relations in Cyprus is the Code 
of Industrial Relations, which is based on the unofficial institution of 
  15 
tripartite cooperation and collective negotiations. Tripartite cooperation 
is crucial to the overall system of industrial relations, described by 
Slocum (1971, p. 54) as a process whereby all government initiatives in 
the field of labour follow an intensive dialogue among  government, the 
unions and the employers to reach consensus before implementation. 
This has helped Cyprus maintain long periods of peaceful labour 
relations. The Code was adopted in 1977 and was based on the earlier 
1962 Basic Agreement of (see Sparsis, 1995, pp. 33-38). Neither 
agreement has legal status; they represent a voluntary agreement 
among the parties. The Code provides for: the right to free organisation, 
the right to strike, what is negotiated and how; it also assigns to the 
Ministry the role of arbitrator in cases of disagreement. 
The Code was essentially a social contract between labour and capital, as 
well as a historic compromise between labour and capital dictated by 
the need for national unity after 1974 (Sparsis, 1998). It also reflected 
the balance of power in the aftermath of the 1974 events that saw the 
trade unions accepting a severe cut in wages and benefits in exchange 
for the completion of the institutional integration of the working class 
and its representatives in the system of tripartite cooperation (Ioannou, 
2011). 
The trade union movement in Cyprus is historically linked to the CPC 
(Katsourides, 2009, chapters 10 and 11). Unlike many of its counterparts, 
upon its founding in 1926, the Cyprus Communist Party could not count 
on an existing network of solid mass organisations for support. Due to 
the late and light industrialisation of the Cypriot economy, trade unions 
were at an infant stage of development in the 1920s. During this period, 
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then, Cypriot communists helped establish or reorganise these nascent 
trade union organisations, in ways that left a lasting imprint on the 
subsequent party/trade union relationship.  From the outset the party 
took a leading role in these labour organisations, and throughout the 
1930s when the CPC was banned by the British colonial authorities, it 
channeled its activity through the trade union movement. By the time 
the PEO was established in 1946, the communists had established de 
facto control of the trade union movement. As a leading member of 
AKEL points out, ‘We founded PEO, not the other way around. This is 




AKEL was established in 1941 as a successor to the illegal Communist 
Party. Its role was decisive in the development of trade unions in Cyprus 
(Christophorou, 2006, p. 299). The PSE, which was also established in 
1941, soon came under the party’s full control or at least its influence. 
Members of AKEL’s central committee actively participated in the PSE’s 
founding Congress and promised support and co-operation. This was not 
without consequence; in the 1943 local elections, the PSE sided with 
those candidates proposed or supported by AKEL, a move that led to a 
split and the departure of some right wing members. Nevertheless, the 
party maintained its close relations to take control of the PEO, the new 
labour union that succeeded PSE in 1946.
7
 
                                                 
6
 Alecou Christos, May 2012. The interview was given to the author and A. Ellinas for the 
purposes of a research study on AKEL’s organisation (Ellinas and Katsourides, 2013, 
forthcoming). 
7
 In January 1946, the Court found guilty 18 individuals, including the leaders of the PSE, on 
charges of being members of an illegal association, i.e., the PSE, and of conspiracy against 
the government. The Court's decision meant that the Pancyprian Trade Unions Committee, 
  17 
Right-wing forces established SEK three years after the founding of the 
PEO, in an attempt to counterbalance AKEL’s influence in the labour 
movement--which caused concern among the dominant classes and the 
Church (Christophorou, 2006, p. 300). Although the conservative class 
comprised numerous and differing factions, they realised that urgent 
and united action was required to confront AKEL. Conservative labour 
forces were first organised in October 1944, when representatives from 
20 trade unions convened in Limassol and decided to establish SEK. SEK 
held its first congress in September 1945, and quickly became a mass 
movement with the support of the Church of Cyprus (Christophorou, 
2006, p. 300). 
In the course of the 1940s, the left and right gradually hardened their 
positions. In 1947 and 1948, industrial action culminated in violence and 
clashes (Christophorou, 2006), creating a climate that echoed the civil 
war in Greece, and offered no remedy to the already tense situation. In 
addition, the two camps took different stances on the national problem, 
competing to be leader and the voice of the people in this crisis. Thus, it 
was at this time that the social and ideological cleavages were formed 
and solidified, and they persist to this day.  
A side effect of this intense situation and mobilisation was an increase in 
trade union membership, which rose from 2,500 in 1939 to more than 
15,000 six years later, and to over 65,000 in 1959 (Christophorou, 2006, 
pp. 310-11). This occurred not only because the labour force was 
growing and sought support; it was also a Greek Cypriot reaction to the 
British authorities’ and employers’ disregard for demands for better 
                                                                                                                                            
which operated openly for five years was declared illegal, thus necessitating the 
establishment of PEO. 
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economic conditions, and the government’s repressive measures against 
demonstrations and industrial action. 
Consequently, industrial relations in Cyprus have always been highly 
politicised. Regardless of ideology, the Cypriot unions are deeply 
embedded in national structures of concertation and social dialogue, 
with an instititutionalised system of tripartite collective bargaining 
involving the state, the trade unions and employer associations. This has 
allowed the trade union movement to organise approximately 80% of 
the labour personnel in Cyprus (Sparsis, 1995, p. 12). 
Before turning to our examination of the current relationships between 
political parties and TUs, it is imperative to examine and analyse recent 
developments in the Cyprus political and party system. The analysis is 
based on Hyman and McCormick (2010) and Schmitter’s (2008) work 
(presented above, section 2.1). 
5. The changing environment  
Cyprus has experienced significant and sometimes rapid changes in its 
social and political environment. The dissolution of the socialist bloc 
(ideology) and Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 are the two most 
important reasons for the changing political scene.. The collapse of the 
socialist bloc posed a serious identity crisis for communist parties 
worldwide, depriving them of a concrete project for their socialist vision. 
AKEL’s relationship with the trade unions was naturally affected by this 
event. Cyprus’s 2004 EU accession saw the island undergo significant 
changes in the short space of 10 years that the rest of Europe 
experienced over several decades. Nevertheless, the country also 
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experienced quite significant changes in the aftermath of the 1974 war.  
Post-1974 the Cyprus economy underwent rapid structural changes, as 
the agriculture-based economy gave way to a tertiary-based economy 
focused primarily on tourism and other services. The working class also 
changed fundamentally: clerical work increased and the educational 
level rose significantly; women gradually entered the work force.  
Moreover, Cyprus’s preparation for EU entry along with an increasingly 
high standard of living changed Cyprus from an exporter of manpower to 
an importing country. The face of the working class gradually changed as 
migrant workers infiltrated the work force, becoming both the victims of 
discrimination and the vehicle for exercising pressure on Cypriot workers 
to accept minimisation of their status (Antoniou, 2010). This created 
new cleavages and tensions, with issues of equal pay, gender 
discrimination and the fight against racism and xenophobia, coming to 
the fore. Cyprus’s EU accession in 2004 aggravated the problem, as this 
led to an influx of EU nationals in the Cyprus labour market. 
The class structure of the entire Cypriot population has in fact changed 
significantly in recent years. While salaried labour has risen significantly 
(Statistical Service of Cyprus 2009, p. 32)—traditionally a pool from 
which the left parties draft members, activists and followers-- most such 
labour is no longer manual and is no longer found in high-density 
workplaces (i.e., factories). Today’s working class is mostly white collar 
employees working in the public and semi-public fields, the banking 
sector and small to medium-sized service enterprises (72.5% of the total 
profitably employed population) where the capacity to organise is 
negligible, as these companies are scattered throughout Cyprus.  
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The new context for labour relations in Cyprus has been largely 
determined by the EU, which promotes deregulation and flexible forms 
of labour. Labour relations today tend to be based on the concept of 
flexicurity-- the new paradigm for labour market reform in the EU 
(Wilthagen, 1998). Collective agreements are constantly undermined 
and labour relations have become much more individualised, with 
workers signing personal contracts. All these developments have had a 
knock-on effect for labour relations and trade unions. Ioannou (2011) 
argues that the deregulation of labour relations in Cyprus is occurring 
within the wider context of globalisation and neoliberalism that the EU 
promotes, but he also believes that the specific conditions in the country 
as well as the local balance of power between labour and capital must 
be taken into consideration. In this regard, he argues, labour (trade 
unions) is now in quite a defensive position.  
The unions recognise that they are unable to organise and mobilise the 
working class, despite the fact that in Cyprus the trade unions are still 
comparatively strong. Their power has been gradually eroded by both 
internal and external factors. Internal factors include workers’ contempt 
and indifference, democratic deficits, the exaggerated power held by the 
trade union bureaucracy, among other things. Although the most 
important factor influencing trade union relations/power is the EU 
stance deregulating the labour market, employers have become more 
aggressive in recent years. Therefore, Ioannou (2011) says, TUs 
distinguish rhetoric and practice, and now avoid lengthy, general strikes 
in favour of “drills of mobilisation”, or symbolic strikes lasting but a very 
few hours and aiming more to exert pressure than to impose a stance. 
This reveals a conceptualisation of strikes as a tool to threaten 
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employers rather than a method of achieving goals. Consequently, trade 
unions today are mostly perceived as organisations that offer services, 
rather than vehicles of struggle. The opening up of the Cypriot labour 
market through EU enlargement, and the rapid growth of a sector not 
covered by collective bargaining, have revealed how eroded the unions’ 
purely economic strength has become. 
The data confirm this new state of affairs. The trend towards abolishing 
any regulatory frameworks-- favoured by EU directives—has led to fewer 
people joining trade unions and political parties. A survey undertaken by 
the PEO in 2009 disclosed that TU membership represented 
approximately 46% of the salaried employees in Cyprus, compared to 
53% found in the corresponding survey in 2004. A further finding is that 
only 30% are actively involved in trade union affairs; the main reason 
that people join a union is for the personal benefits attached to 
membership, a finding that concurs with what Schmitter (2008) calls 
individuation.  
The recent changes have also affected the political parties. The 
traditional hegemony of politicians is weakening as a result of external 
pressures (EU) as well as changes in the social structure of Cypriot 
society. There are scholars who believe that the process of 
Europeanisation has been a strong force in fostering changes in the 
party and political systems in general (Mouzelis, 1994, p. 25), and in 
Cyprus in particular (Katsourides, 2003), and that the changes favour the 
development of civil society (Mavratsas, 2003, p. 152). The EU 
encourages the government to boost the civil society sector and 
enhance its cooperation with CSOs. EU accession has also opened up 
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new channels for the CSOs to pursue their policies directly with the 
European Commission and the Parliament either through the Cypriot 
MEPs or through other CSOs operating in Brussels (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 27). 
This changing context has been a apparent in the CSO sector since the 
1990s (see section 3).  
Current developments indicate that the power of the political parties is 
rapidly declining. There are clear indications of party dealignment in 
Cyprus: in 2008, 37% of those asked about their party ties in the 
European Social Survey (ESS) replied that they felt no affiliation to any 
party; two years later 51% replied that they did not feel close to the 
party they had voted for just a few months earlier in the 2011 
parliamentary elections (Kathimerini, 15 July 2012, p. 4). Abstention 
rates reached a significant 41% in the Euro elections of 2009 and 21.3% 
in the latest national elections of May 2011, a most unusual occurrence 
in Cyprus politics. The public’s trust in political, social and representative 
institutions and the politicians is at a historic low with only one 
unexpected exception: the Church (CyBC1, 17 March 2011). The contrast 
with the figures of the corresponding 1996 survey is suggestive (Table 1). 
The Civicus Report (2011, p. 60) revealed similar results, finding that the 
most trustworthy institution was the Church, with 33.3% trusting it a 
great deal, while the least trustworthy institutions were the television 
stations with only 4.4%, preceded only slightly by the political parties at 
4.9%. 
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TABLE 1: Level of trust in various institutions (%) 
Institution / Year 1996 2011 Variation 
National Council 93 73 -20 
Church 58 69 +11 
Education 82 67 -15 
Police 62 56 -6 
Trade Unions 72 46 -26 
Government 60 44 -16 
Parliament 79 41 -38 
Parties 42 23 -19 
Politicians 34 21 -13 
Source: CyBC 1 Poll, 17 April 2011. 
 
The ESS surveys (2008; 2010) and the latest Eurobarometres also 
highlight the same trend with regard to political institutions (Tables 2 
and 3). The same negative trend is also found with regard to TUs. The 
CyBC survey (2011) identified a 26% drop in the level of trust in TUs 
compared to the 1996 figure. A recent survey by the largest trade union 
in Cyprus, the left-wing PEO (2009), reveals that only 50% of the 
population positively evaluate the TUs’ contribution in society compared 
to a 62% in the respective survey in 1999. 
TABLE 2: Levels of trust in political institutions (scale 0-10) 
 CYPRUS 
2008 2010 
Trust in country’s parliament 5.44 4.59 
Trust in the politicians 4.38 3.59 
Trust in political parties 4.26 3.52 
Source: ESS Surveys 2008 and 2010. 
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TABLE 3: Trust in political parties (%) 
 CYPRUS 
2008 2011 
Trust in political parties  33 8 
Source: Eurobarometre no. 69 (2008) and no. 76 (2011). 
 
The ESS surveys also revealed that political participation is increasingly 
declining in Cyprus, while placing political demands is increasingly more 
individualised (Katsourides, 2013, forthcoming). The era of collective and 
organised mobilisation through the mediation of political parties and 
TUs seems to have been replaced by an attitude of repugnance towards 
collective forms of action and conventional politics.  




Voted last national election  86.5 79.2 
Contacted politician or government official  19.3 18.7 
Worked in political party or action group  7.8 4.3 
Worked in another organization or association  7.1 6.4 
Wore or displayed campaign badge/sticker  7.6 5.4 
Signed petition  5.6 7.2 
Took part in lawful public demonstration  2.3 4.1 
Boycotted certain products                           5.8 5.4 
Source: ESS Surveys 2008 and 2010.  
 
In addition, the findings shown in Table 4 indicate that political activism 
in Cyprus is a minority-driven process, and while this is the case in many 
other European countries, what differs is the unique status of Cyprus as 
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an occupied country – which might lead one to anticipate increased 
levels of political participation. The findings also reflect the lack of a 
participatory civil culture among Cypriots compared to other established 
European democracies. 
6. Assessing contemporary relationships between political 
parties and TUs 
This section will examine the relationships between political parties and 
TUs in light of the changes analysed in the preceding section. The two 
largest trade unions in the private sector (PEO and SEK) will be 
considered in terms of their relationships to the two major political 
parties in Cyprus, AKEL and DISY. Trade Unions in Cyprus are very 
powerful and their membership comprises over 50% of the Cypriot 
workforce (PEO Survey, 2009, p. 5), with PEO totaling 83,000 members 
and SEK 73,000 (Cyprus total population is 750,000). However, within a 
short period of 15 years, their ability to organise has steadily declined, 
considering that in the mid-1990s, TUs were able to organise 
approximately 80% of the workforce in Cyprus (Sparsis, 1995, p. 12). 
The Cyprus trade union membership has followed worldwide patterns: 
the percentage of blue collar workers is shrinking in favour of white 
collar workers, with rough estimates indicating that membership is 
almost equally divided between the two. Membership provides trade 
unions with the bulk of their income since all members must turn over 
1% of their salary to the trade union (Tombazos and Matsas interviews). 
State funding is not provided except in the cases of grants given for 
building rest facilities for their members or for research projects where 
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there is open competition. Funding from parties or vice versa is explicitly 
forbidden and does not occur. The financial muscle of Cypriot political 
parties is still strong, however, capitalising on their exchange and 
colonisation of the state. The largest part of parties’ income originates 
from the state budget (see Table 5),
8
 which could suggest that trade 
unions are becoming obsolete for party purposes. However, this is not 
the case, especially for the left-wing AKEL (Kolokasides interview). 
TABLE 5: Funding of Cypriot political parties (total)
9
 















Source: Annual State Budgets 
* 1 CYP equals approximately €1.60. 
** Cyprus entered the Eurozone in 2008. 
                                                 
8
 The political parties of Cyprus receive an annual state subsidy that covers important 
aspects of their operation. An additional subsidy is given in election years. 
9
 The figures represent the funding granted to parliamentary parties on the basis of 
proportionality according to their vote share. For the years 1996-2001 there were five 
parliamentary parties, for the period 2001-2006,eight and for the period 2006-2011, six. 
During election years (e.g., 2001, 2006, 2011) the grant is increased to cover election 
expenses. 
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Personal interviews with party officials and their official documents 
reveal different as well as evolving attitudes/strategies towards CSOs in 
general and TUs in particular. AKEL maintains a long-standing strategy of 
developing its own networks of social organisation based around youth, 
sport and, more recently, other targeted groups and activities. AKEL is 
also bolstered by a number of auxiliary organisations – what the party 
calls “the popular movement”-- which represent important segments of 
society like workers, farmers, women and youth. They offer AKEL a 
dense network of officials and members to communicate messages, 
mobilise support and recruit members. AKEL is additionally affiliated 
with a number of cultural, athletic and professional associations and 
clubs, which enable the party message to be conveyed to various specific 
audiences as well as the general population. This strategy clearly places 
the party in a prime position vis-à-vis CSOs.  
AKEL asserts that some CSOs purposefully degrade the concept of 
‘organised struggle, to instead promote individualistic concerns and 
interests -- which results in the “splitting of forces in the world of labour. 
The various CSOs do not address the opposition between labour and 
capital as the major source of conflict and inequality and choose to focus 
instead on “soft” issues’ (Kolokasides interview). According to this line of 
criticism, the concept of civil society minimises the role of social classes 
as the main political subjects and obscures the class struggle, placing an 
overly heavy emphasis on other types of organisations. Proponents of 
civil society idealise its various forms and present them as alternatives to 
the parties. AKEL criticises CSOs for their view of civil society as a post-
modern and alternative system of political representation that is in 
opposition to the traditional political and party system (AKEL, 2010, p. 
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43). Therefore, they see CSOs as representing an alternative political 
system whose “platform” is their expert knowledge or a special 
sensitivity to a certain issue; they are not seen as functioning on the 
basis of society’s mandate.  
The party advises engagement in trade union activities instead, believing 
that many of these activities would be even more beneficial if they were 
organised and executed by a combination of party mechanisms and TUs. 
Furthermore, AKEL does not believe that CSOs are the only option for 
active citizens who want to make a contribution to society, and the party 
acknowledges that this sector has evolved independent of party beliefs. 
Therefore, the party tries to influence these organisations’ activities. 
‘Our members and voters do not enter these organisations in order to 
control them but if they do get involved we expect them to 
communicate the party’s positions on the issues at hand’ (Kolokasides 
interview).  
DISY, on the other hand is more receptive to CSOs and encourages their 
activities, seeing the relationship between the two groups as 
complementary (Stylianides interview). DISY also believes that political 
parties ought to perform an administrative role within society and leave 
action up to the CSOs. This viewpoint concurs with the party’s liberal 
ideology that sees the state (and the parties that control its 
mechanisms) as responsible for providing the contextual parameters for 
private initiatives of any kind to flourish. DISY does not especially 
encourage its members to engage in civil society activities and states 
outright that party officials should not be involved in the administration 
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of CSOs (Theocharous interview). TUs are not treated any differently 
than other CSOs. 
DISY realises that SEK represents a large part of DISY’s constituency 
(Tornaritis interview)—resulting from the ideological legacy of the 1940s 
and 1950s. The party also acknowledges that the union will try to 
advance its members’ interests in various ways. So while the party notes 
their demands they do not necessarily comply with them. SEK in 
particular (TUS in general) is just one of the many social organisations 
that the party must listen to; the two have no privileged relationship. 
What is privileged, according to the party, is TU status in society, which 
is not always in the citizens’ best interest. TUs use their power to 
influence the parties to respond to their demands. 
In recent years DISY has adopted an even more open policy towards 
interest groups while maintaining its traditional ties with certain trade 
unions and other CSOs of the first wave (i.e., cultural and football 
associations, national organisations, etc.). The party’s new approach is 
reflected in the revised party statute (DISY, 2010), which calls for 
dialogue with civil society (article 3.7) and public deliberation with NGOs 
(article 3.11); further now NGOs may participate in party forums and 
most importantly, their members can be appointed to DISY’s Supreme 
Council (article 14.20). Informally, i.e., not mandated, the party 
undertakes a variety of strategies to establish contacts with interest 
groups and participate in social platforms and forums.  
While the context for the parties/ TUs relationships has changed 
significantly (see above), these relationships still reflect the two groups’ 
specific history (see section 3.1). The two unions under consideration 
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have historical bonds and affiliations with the two respective parties, 
although these are not official bonds and the unions feel politically 
affiliated (Tombazos and Matsas interviews). And while neither trade 
union stipulates political allegiance of its members, union officials 
concede that the overwhelming majority of their membership votes for 
the two particular parties. However, a number of SEK members vote for 
the centre-right DIKO and EUROKO (Tornaritis interview). 
The PEO and AKEL have a much stronger affiliation because of the 
circumstances of establishment: ‘AKEL is the one that created the labour 
movement of Cyprus and PEO itself” (Tombazos interview). The PEO has 
been politically attached to AKEL since the party’s founding in 1941. 
Because it represents broad economic interests, the PEO enjoys 
considerable autonomy and flexibility: ‘politically and ideologically there 
is an informal acknowledgement that the party directs the popular 
movement. In social and labour issues, though, the role of PEO is 
important. It is not a one- but a two-way relationship’ (PEO general 
secretary Kyritsis, personal interview).
10
  The PEO’s relationship with the 
popular movement has offered AKEL significant organisational 
advantages in communicating party messages to society, recording voter 
preferences and recruiting candidates (Ellinas and Katsourides, 2013 
forthcoming).   
While SEK is generally more cautious, it has nevertheless declared its 
political affiliation on various occasions: in the 2008 presidential 
elections SEK asked members to vote for DISY candidate, Ioannis 
                                                 
10
 Interview with Pambis Kyritsis, General Secretary of PEO and Member of the Secretariat of 
the AKEL’s Politburo, June 2012. The interview was given to the author and A. Ellinas (see 
note 6). 
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Kasoulides,
11
 and in 2013 SEK supported DISY’s president N. 
Anastasiades.
12
 Matsas (interview) explained their stance: ‘SEK always 
votes, in either round of the elections, for the candidate who is not 
supported by the left’. The main difference between the two unions is 
that PEO officials and paid staff are free to run for any party or public 
post, whilst SEK forbids this, except for municipal or community offices. 
SEK does not officially participate in DISY bodies adds Tornaritis 
(interview). 
Officials from both unions (Tombazos and Matsas interviews) agree that 
all parties respect the PEO and SEK and listen to their positions. Although 
both unions approach all political parties when they want to advance 
legislation amendments or other demands, they admit that AKEL 
generally favours PEO and DISY will pay more heed to SEK. There are no 
direct links between SEK and any political party (Matsas interview), while 
the Secretary General of PEO belongs to the seven-member Secretariat 
of AKEL. Moreover, a number of PEO officials participate in the Central 
Committee and other district organs of AKEL. In the latest party congress 
in 2010, 15 of the 105 members elected in the central committee were 
salaried employees of PEO.  This organisational overlap gives AKEL an 
efficient mechanism to transmit political decisions to PEO. At the same 
time it points to a form of overlapping leadership and membership 
beyond political and ideological affiliation. SEK, on the other hand, 
maintains close relations with a number of first-class cadres of DISY and 
uses these relations to advance policy goals (Matsas interview). 
                                                 
11
 SEK Press Release 18 February 2008. 
12
 SEK Press Release 13 February 2013.  
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With regard to the way of placing demands both unions favour collective 
bargaining. However, they both also feel that labour relations now, in 
the post-EU-accession period, lean toward deregulation of the labour 
market and private contracts. They both concur that employer 
associations are becoming more aggressive. Strikes have not been much 
used in recent years (Table 6)—a fact that Matsas (interview) attributes 
to a Cypriot ethos that does not like conflictual situations as well as to 
workers’ desire  to keep their jobs. This could well change, due to 
Cyprus’s recent acceptance of the EU memorandum of understanding.  
TABLE 6: Number of strikes 















Source: Labour Statistics (2011), Statistical Service of Cyprus, Series II, Report No. 30, 
Ministry of Finance, Nicosia. 
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In fact, a change in attitude was already evident in 2011 where the 
number of strikes increased significantly in relation to previous years. 
The low incidence of strikes might also be interpreted as the unions’ 
inability to mobilise workers to strike in protest, so that they were 
forced to re-direct their efforts through political channels. This would 
confirm Pizzorno’s thesis (cited in Hyman and McCormick, 2010, p. 319) 
that ‘what unions traded in the political arena was consent, or at least 
abstention, from militant opposition to government policy’. The power 
of the TUs in previous years was “rewarded” by the state and the 
employers with consent to union’s demands. It is anticipated that the 
new nature of labour relations will change this pattern, resulting in an 
escalation of tension and a decline in the unions’ status. In fact, SEK 
already admits that the TUs are not as powerful as they once were 
(Matsas interview). 
In Cyprus there is a reciprocal influence between the trade unions and 
the parties, with the parties influencing trade unions on political issues, 
and the unions influencing the parties on labour and trade union 
matters. However, AKEL exerts a stronger influence over the PEO than 
DISY does over SEK (Kolokasides interview). And while the connection 
seems relatively strong for both actors, especially for the PEO and AKEL, 
in fact no direct economic affiliation exists. The same applies for DISY 
and SEK (Tornaritis interview). The unions do not allocate their support 
across the party system but seem to hold exclusive relations with their 
respective parties. 
We can now draw some preliminary conclusions on the relationship 
between the TUs and the two political parties under consideration. The 
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relationships between the two groups are clearly fashioned by certain 
factors: institutional, structural, historical, etc. It is also evident in recent 
years that their relationships have been steadily weakened, with the TUs 
losing more heavily. The parties remain more or less in control of the 
political process and governments and therefore posses more actual 
power. However, this could change fundamentally as a result of the 
signing of the MOA.  
The parties’ pursuit of voters in competitive elections and the TUs’ goal 
to influence political decisions also deserve special attention. The cost-
benefit question (see Allern, 2010) provides a key for understanding the 
two actors’ relationships i.e., both actors will pursue a close relationship 
when this benefits them both, or will be more independent when the 
context changes. However, electoral considerations cannot capture the 
complexity governing their relationships. Ideological and historical 
legacies cannot be discarded altogether; this is clearer with regard to 
AKEL. Despite the pluralistic nature of the relationships between parties 
and the TUs, some relationships, such as that between AKEL and PEO, 
remain strong, while DISY has a less clear relationship with SEK. 
However, both unions seem locked into old identities derived from their 
traditional ideological and political allegiances. The TUs, for their part, 
employ lobbying practices to advance their interests and views on the 
political parties- without discrimination. This practice corresponds with 
Katz and Mair’s (1995, p. 23) argument that interest groups prefer more 
room for manoeuvre and do not want to run the risk of being tainted by 
association with particular parties.  
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The relationship between the PEO and AKEL resembles the Leninist 
model presented in section 2.1 with the party having clearly the pole 
position. The DISY -- SEK relationship seems more flexible with no overt 
alliance, although. Their ideological affinity and political allegiance are 
quite clear. 
7. Conclusions  
The ties between CSOs and political parties are significant in Cyprus, 
where historically there has been a strong party system that embraced 
many societal activities and institutions. This was certainly the scenario 
for the first wave of Cypriot CSOs, most of which were established under 
the auspices of the two political blocks. The second wave of CSOs is 
characterised by a different, more cautious relationship with the political 
parties, which, of course, has an impact on the parties’ positions. This 
newer relationship does not preclude CSOs from lobbying for their 
causes, but it means that all parties are lobbied irrespective of political 
agenda. This new scenario also involves the TUs, clearly the most 
influential of the CSOs. The direction of the influence between parties 
and TUs seems to vary significantly and this makes generalisations 
difficult. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be a one-way relationship. TU 
forums are usually open for all political parties and most appeal to all 
political parties, despite the privileged relationships they maintain with 
their ideological party allies.   
Despite the developments analysed in the article that signal the 
beginning of party crisis and dealignment, political parties in the 
Republic of Cyprus remain extremely influential (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 58). 
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Greek Cypriots tend to think almost everything is a political cause and so 
therefore it is the duty of politicians to deal with almost all issues facing 
society. Political power, as exercised by the state and political parties, 
therefore assumes a hegemonic role, controlling not only the economy 
but also society at large. The TUs appear to be experiencing similar 
problems but are probably in a more disadvantageous position. Their 
actual power is diminishing and the MOA has inflicted powerful changes 
in areas previously governed by the collective agreements.  
The strong historical bonds between parties and TUs do not necessarily 
guarantee their continuation. The relationships and alliances between 
parties and TUs are not on autopilot. They evolve according to the 
strategies pursued by both set of actors as well as other forces operating 
outside their control (e.g., the EU). The Cypriot political parties do not 
seem to approach the issue in a uniform way: AKEL continues to place 
prominence on a more or less controlled network of auxiliary 
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